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NOTE
KATRINA, FEDERALISM, AND MILITARY LAW
ENFORCEMENT: A NEW EXCEPTION TO
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT
Sean McGrane*
In the days following Hurricane Katrina, as lawlessness and vio-
lence spread throughout New Orleans, the White House considered
invoking the Insurrection Act so that members of the U.S. military
could legally perform law enforcement functions inside the flooded
city. This Note contends that the White House's decision not to in-
voke the Act was substantially driven by federalism concerns-in
particular, concerns about intruding on Louisiana's sovereignty.
But, this Note further contends, in focusing so heavily on these state
sovereignty concerns, the White House largely ignored the other
side of the 'federalism coin "-namely, enabling the federal gov-
ernment to act where national action is desirable. To address future
situations where the president may desire to deploy troops domesti-
cally for law enforcement functions but may be hesitant to do so for
fear of intruding on a state's sovereignty, this Note urges Congress
to create a procedural mechanism whereby the president may go to
a specially-created judicial body and seek a "warrant" to deploy
members of the military for domestic law enforcement. This proce-
dural mechanism would not be entirely new-indeed, the Second
Congress of the United States imposed a similar 'judicial certifica-
tion" requirement on the president's ability to deploy the military
domestically for law enforcement functions. The procedure sug-
gested here, however, would supplement and not replace the
president's current Insurrection Act powers.
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INTRODUCTION
The Posse Comitatus Act ("PCA") bars members of the U.S. military
from enforcing domestic laws.' The PCA prevents members of the military
from performing those law enforcement tasks that are traditionally handled by
police and other domestic law enforcement officials-tasks like conducting
investigations into alleged criminal activity and arresting suspected criminals.
For example, if an Army captain witnesses a person within the United States
commit a robbery, the captain may not arrest that person, even if the captain is
standing inches away from the perpetrator as the crime occurs.
The language of the PCA specifically authorizes Congress to create
exceptions to the Act as it sees fit.3 The most notable exception to the PCA
is the Insurrection Act,4 which authorizes the president, when certain condi-
tions have been met, to deploy the military inside the United States to
perform traditional law enforcement functions. When the Insurrection Act
has been invoked, the PCA's restrictions are lifted and members of the mili-
tary, under the command of the president, are free to arrest U.S. citizens for
violations of state and federal law. Thus, when the president has invoked the
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006). The phrase "posse comitatus" is Latin for "power of the coun-
ty," and refers to a sheriff's common law authority to gather and command able-bodied citizens to
enforce the law. See Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Construction and Application of Posse Comitatus
Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1385), and Similar Predecessor Provisions, Restricting Use of United States
Army and Air Force to Execute Laws, 141 A.L.R. FED. 271, § 2(a) (1997). The Posse Comitatus Act
is so called because it forbids the use of "any part of the Army or ... Air Force as a posse comi-
tatus." 18 U.S.C. § 1385. Members of the military cannot join the sheriff's "posse" to enforce
domestic law.
2. It is possible that the Army captain, just like any other citizen, could attempt a "citizen's
arrest" of the alleged robber. But the practice of citizen's arrest is outside the scope of this Note,
since the authority to effectuate such an arrest is derived from citizenship, not from a position in the
armed forces. For more on the practice of citizen's arrest, see Alvin Stauber, Citizen's Arrest: Rights
and Responsibilities, 18 MIDWEsT L. REV. 31 (2002).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1385.
4. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-333 (2006).
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Insurrection Act, the hypothetical Army captain may legally arrest the hypo-
thetical robber.
The PCA is rooted in federalism. Federalism, in the words of the U.S.
Supreme Court, is the constitutional principle under which "the [n]ational
[g]overnment, anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal
rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the [s]tates." 6 Federalism is
concerned with striking the appropriate balance between, on the one hand,
respecting state sovereignty and state authority; and, on the other, "enabling
the federal government to act where national action is desirable. 7 In the
American system, this balance between state and federal power has tradi-
tionally been struck through the political process.8 James Madison
envisioned a system in which the state and federal governments kept each
other in check by competing for the affections of the people through the
political process.9 Today, concepts of federalism "shape government, law
and politics."' 0 Indeed, the Court has noted that "[flederalism serves to as-
sign political responsibility, not to obscure it."" Thus, while the precise
nature and scope of American federalism remains subject to great debate,
the term is used throughout this Note to refer broadly to the set of legal and
political considerations that underlie the allocation of power between the
federal government and the sovereign states.
The PCA and the Insurrection Act implicate opposite sides of the feder-
alism coin: the PCA is concerned with preserving state authority, while the
Insurrection Act is concerned with promoting federal power. Law enforce-
ment is principally the province of the states, and when the U.S. military
intrudes on this province, the authority of the states is compromised. The
PCA prevents this intrusion and "preserves federalism by making state and
local governments responsible for most law enforcement."'' 2 The Insurrec-
tion Act, as an exception to the PCA, recognizes that in certain
circumstances the national interest is best promoted by the federal military
performing law enforcement functions within the states.
5. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
6. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
7. Larry Kramer, What's a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Acker-
man and the New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 920 (1996).
8. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison); see also U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77
(1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If, as Madison expected, the Federal and State Governments are
to control each other, see The Federalist No. 51, and hold each other in check by competing for the
affections of the people, see The Federalist No. 46, those citizens must have some means of know-
ing which of the two governments to hold accountable for the failure to perform a given function.").
10. Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 543 (1954).
11. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621,636 (1992).
12. Gregory E. Maggs, Assessing the Legality of Counterterrorism Measures Without Char-
acterizing Them as Law Enforcement or Military Action, 80 TEMP. L. REv. 661, 670 (2007).
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Despite serving opposite sides of the federalism coin, the PCA and the
Insurrection Act have coexisted in relative harmony for more than a century.
The Insurrection Act carves out a narrow exception to the PCA, invoked
only where an insurrection has arisen within a state, and where the local and
state law enforcement agents are incapable of quelling the insurrection.
The Insurrection Act authorizes the president to deploy troops for domestic
law enforcement either when the state government requests such assistance
or when the president makes an independent determination that the military
is required to enforce federal law. In the latter instance, the president may
deploy troops regardless of whether the state desires such assistance; indeed,
he may deploy troops even when the state government expressly opposes such
a move. In this instance, the federalism concerns are highest. But since the
Civil War, the Insurrection Act has been invoked almost exclusively upon re-
quest by state governments. In the post-Civil War era, the president has
deployed troops absent a state government's request for only one purpose-to
integrate southern schools in the 1950s and 1960s.'4 Because the Insurrection
Act remains a narrow exception to the PCA, and because the Act is rarely in-
voked without a state government's request, the limits of the Insurrection Act
and the PCA have gone mostly untested for more than a century.
That all changed in late August 2005, when Hurricane Katrina
("Katrina")-the third most powerful hurricane to strike the United States in
recorded history' 5-made landfall on the Gulf Coast.16 While the eye of the
hurricane made landfall some seventy miles east of New Orleans,'" it was in
that city, in the hours and days after Katrina struck, that the limits of the
Insurrection Act and the PCA were tested. The inability of local and state
officials to stop rampant looting in and around New Orleans created a secu-
rity vacuum that some believe should have been filled by members of the
U.S. military.'8 Had Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco requested federal
assistance under the Insurrection Act, or had President Bush invoked the Act
unilaterally, the military could have filled this security vacuum. But for a
variety of reasons neither official took such action, and as a result the PCA
prevented military personnel already in Louisiana for rescue and relief ef-
forts from performing law enforcement functions.
This Note argues that federalism concerns substantially motivated Presi-
dent Bush's decision not to invoke the Insurrection Act after Katrina. It
13. See 10 U.S.C. § 331-333 (2006).
14. Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Military Response: Political Issues Snarled Plans
For Troop Aid, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 9, 2005, at A l [hereinafter Lipton, Military Response].
15. Discovery Channel: Surviving Katrina: Facts About Katrina, http://dsc.discovery.coml
convergence/katrina/facts/facts.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
16. See infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Nicholas Lemann, Comment, Insurrection, NEW YORKER, Sep. 26, 2005, at 67,
67, available at http://www.newyorker.comarchive/2005/09/26/050926ta-talk-lemann ("Whatever
its failings before the hurricane hit, the federal government could have greatly lessened the disaster
if it had acted immediately afterward as a direct enforcer of the law. People suffered and died be-
cause it did not.").
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further argues that the PCA and the Insurrection Act should be changed to
give the president greater flexibility to deploy troops to perform law en-
forcement functions when faced with similar federalism constraints in future
catastrophes. Part I details the role the Insurrection Act and the Posse Coni-
tatus Act played in the state and federal response to Katrina. Part I further
discusses the federalism concerns that underlie the Insurrection Act, the
PCA, and the Stafford Act-the Act that governs the federal disaster and
emergency relief system. Part II argues that the Bush Administration's deci-
sion not to invoke the Insurrection Act was substantially driven by
federalism-in particular, concerns about intruding on Louisiana's authority
without the state's consent. Part II then contends that Congress strengthened
the "federalism check"' 9 on the president's Insurrection Act powers in the
years after Katrina, and that by strengthening this federalism check, Con-
gress ignored important federal interests that underlie the Insurrection Act.
Part III borrows an idea from the founding generation and suggests that
Congress create a new statutory exception to the PCA, whereby the presi-
dent may go to a judicial body to seek authority-a sort of warrant-to
deploy military personnel domestically to enforce the laws. This exception
would supplement and not replace the president's existing Insurrection Act
powers. Part III defines the contours of this new judicial body and offers
several justifications for its creation.
I. HURRICANE KATRINA AND MILITARY LAW ENFORCEMENT
As federal and state officials worked to respond to the devastation
Katrina wreaked on the Gulf Coast, one key question that led to protracted
debate and confusion centered on what role, if any, the federal military
should play in performing domestic law enforcement functions inside New
Orleans. Part L.A discusses the effects Katrina had on New Orleans, and
documents the lawlessness that gripped the city in the days after the storm.
Part I.B details the debate between state and federal officials over the mili-
tary's role inside New Orleans following Katrina. Part I.B also identifies the
crucial roles the PCA and Insurrection Act played in that debate. Part I.C
traces the historical and theoretical development of the PCA, the Insurrec-
tion Act, and the Stafford Act, and identifies the federalism concerns that
underlie this triad of laws.
A. Katrina: Landfall and a City in "Anarchy"
On Saturday, August 27, 2005, as Hurricane Katrina churned through
the Gulf of Mexico, Dr. Jeff Masters, the overseer of a popular online tropi-
cal weather community, made the following observation:
19. Throughout this Note, the term "federalism check" will be used to refer to the considera-
tions of state sovereignty that militate against invoking the Insurrection Act without a state
government's consent.
1313May 2010]
Michigan Law Review
I'd hate to be an Emergency Management official in New Orleans right
now. Katrina is pretty much following the [National Hurricane Center]
forecast, and appears likely to pass VERY close to New Orleans. I'm sur-
prised they haven't ordered an evacuation of the city yet. While the odds of
a catastrophic hit that would completely flood the city of New Orleans are
probably 10%, that is way too high in my opinion to justify leaving the
people in the city. If I lived in the city, I would evacuate NOW! There is a
very good reason that the Coroner's office in New Orleans keeps 10,000
body bags on hand.... GO! New Orleans needs a full 72 hours to evacu-
ate, and landfall is already less than 72 hours away.20
By the following day, Sunday the 28th, Katrina had strengthened into a
Category 5 hurricane, with winds exceeding 160 miles per hour.2' On Mon-
day, August 29, at 10 a.m. (CDT), Katrina's "eyewall"-the spot within a
hurricane where the most damaging winds and intense rainfall are found 22-
made landfall along the Louisiana-Mississippi border.23 Although Katrina
had weakened to a Category 3 storm by landfall,24 the damage she inflicted
on the Gulf Coast was catastrophic, killing at least 1400 people and leaving
• 25
behind an estimated $80 billion in property damage.
As Dr. Masters had predicted two days prior to landfall, Katrina did not
directly strike New Orleans, the eye wall coming ashore some seventy miles
east of the city. But despite avoiding a direct hit, New Orleans was not
spared Katrina's wrath. On the morning of Tuesday, August 30, the front
page of the New Orleans Times-Picayune contained the following report
underneath a headline reading "CATASTROPHIC":
Hurricane Katrina struck metropolitan New Orleans on Monday with a
staggering blow, far surpassing Hurricane Betsy, the landmark disaster of
an earlier generation. The storm flooded huge swaths of the city, as well as
Slidell on the north shore of Lake Pontchartrain, in a process that appeared
to be spreading even as night fell.
A powerful storm surge pushed huge waves ahead of the hurricane,
flooding much of St. Bernard Parish and New Orleans' Lower 9th Ward,
just as Betsy 40 years ago. But this time the flooding was more extensive,
20. Wunder Blog: Weather Underground, New Orleans to Pensacola at high risk from Katri-
na, http:llwww.wunderground.comlbloglJeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=78 (Aug. 27, 2005,
16:05 GMT).
21. Wunder Blog: Weather Underground, Katrina: Category 5, http:/Iwww.
wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.htmlentrynum=80 (Aug. 28, 2005, 12:24 GMT).
22. University of Illinois Weather World 2010 Project, The Eye Wall: A Hurricane's
Most Devastating Region, http://ww20lO.atmos.uiuc.edul%28Gh%29/guideslmtrlhurr/stages/canel
wall.rxml (last visited Feb. 5, 2010).
23. Wunder Blog: Weather Underground, Category 3 Katrina pounding Gulf coast, http:ll
www.wunderground.com/blog/JeffMasters/comment.htmlentrynum=80 (Aug. 29, 2005, 15:17
GMT).
24. See id.
25. Jeff Franks & Russell McCulley, Update 1-New Orleans dead remembered on Katrina
anniversary, REUTERS, Aug. 29, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/bondsNews/
idUSN2937322420070829.
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spreading upriver as well to cover parts of the Bywater, Marginy and
Treme neighborhoods.
As with Betsy, people scrambled into their attics or atop their roofs,
pleading for help from the few passers-by. 6
As the floodwaters spread, looters began taking to the city streets. Early
reports indicated that the looting centered around essentials like food, water,
and ice. On Wednesday, August 31, two days after Katrina had made land-
fall, a reporter in New Orleans noted that a crowd had stormed a pharmacy
and emerged carrying "so much ice, water and food that it dropped from
their arms as they ran. The street was littered with packages of ramen noo-
dles and other items. 27 Noting that the looting had started after citizens
trapped within the flooded city had run out of food, New Orleans Mayor C.
,21Ray Nagin commented: "[Ylou can't really argue with that too much."
By Wednesday evening, however, reports suggested that the looting had
taken a more nefarious turn. Mayor Nagin himself acknowledged that the
looting had "escalated to this kind of mass chaos where people are taking
electronic stuff and all that., 29 Looters honed in on a variety of goods-
jeans, tennis shoes, TV sets, "trunkloads of beer."3 ° In one incident, a New
Orleans police officer was wounded when he and several other officers con-
fronted two men looting a convenience store, and the two men opened fire
on them.3 In another incident, police officers themselves were accused of
joining in on the looting of a Cadillac dealership and a Wal-Mart. 32 Car ste-
reos and batteries were stolen from the parking garage of a city hospital.33
Residents of a nursing home were forced to evacuate after bands of looters
drove by the home, threatening the residents and shouting, "Get out!" At
New Orleans' Charity Hospital, as nurses rushed to evacuate critically ill
patients, a sniper hidden in a nearby high-rise opened fire and forced the
26. Bruce Nolan, CATASTOPRHIC: Storm Surge Swamps 9th Ward, St. Bernard,
TIMES-PIcAYUNE, Aug. 30, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nola.com/katrina/pages/
083005/083005_aOlaO2.pdf.
27. John Esterbrook, New Orleans Fights To Stop Looting: Police Ordered To Halt Rescues;
Governor Asks For Federal Help, CBSNEwS.COM, Aug. 31, 2005, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2005/08/3 l/katrina/main808193.shtml.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.; Associated Press, New Orleans mayor orders looting crackdown: Thousands feared
dead from Katrina's wrath; stadium evacuation begins, MSNBC.coM, Sept. 1, 2005, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9063708.
31. Brendan McCarthy, 2 Caught in Katrina Police Shooting, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 19,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 19879944.
32. Julia Reed, Dodging Bullets: How New Orleans coped after Gustav--and readied for its
heirs, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.newsweek.com/id/157485.
33. Esterbrook, supra note 27.
34. Id.
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staff and patients back into the hospital. 5 More than 600 firearms were
36looted from area pawnshops and gun dealerships following the storm. The
New Orleans Times-Picayune reported that the gun section at a new Wal-
Mart had been "cleaned out by looters."37 By Wednesday evening, according
to New Orleans' homeland security director, police had received numerous
reports of gangs of armed men roaming the city and robbing people in the
neighborhoods most damaged by Katrina."' Mayor Nagin, recognizing that
looters "are starting to get closer to heavily populated areas," ordered 1500
police officers to abandon their search-and-rescue missions and return to the
streets in an effort to stop the looting.39
For a variety of reasons, the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD")
proved unable to stop the looting as it spread throughout the city. First and
foremost, members of the NOPD had other and arguably more pressing
concerns-rescue-and-relief efforts aimed at saving the lives of those
trapped within the flooded city. As New Orleans Police Captain Marlon De-
fillo said two days after the storm, "We're multitasking right now ....
Rescue, recovery, stabilization of looting, we're trying to feed the hungry."4
Second, as if this range of responsibilities weren't challenging enough, the
NOPD faced an internal problem: desertions. In the immediate aftermath of
the storm, the NOPD was unable to account for some 240 members of its
1450-member force.4 Not all of the unaccounted-for members were desert-
ers, but fifty-one were eventually fired for deserting after Katrina hit.
Another fifteen resigned when investigations into their alleged desertions
began. 4' Third, because of the severe flooding in certain parts of the city, the
43NOPD was unable to reach many of the most lawless areas.
As will be discussed in greater detail below," members of a state's na-
tional guard, when acting under the command and control of the state
governor, are not constrained by the PCA, and thus are free to perform tradi-
tional law enforcement functions. Prior to the storm, Louisiana Governor
Kathleen Blanco activated 3500 of the state's 10,000-member Guard.4' But
35. Ellen Barry et al., In Katrina's Aftermath: Chaos and Survival: New Orleans Slides Into
Chaos, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at 1.
36. Michael Perlstein & Trymaine Lee, Looters Continue to Prey on Storm Victims Even as
Flooded Homes are Being Rebuilt, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 22, 2006.
37. Esterbrook, supra note 27 (citing a "IMES-PICAYUNE report).
38. Michael Perlstein & Trymaine Lee, As Evidence Floods, Criminal Cases Likely to Col-
lapse: Court basement also housed thousands of appeals, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 1, 2005, at A6.
39. Esterbrook, supra note 27.
40. Id.
41. Associated Press, N.O. Police Fire 51 for Desertion, FOXNEws.coM, Oct. 30, 2005,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,173879,00.html.
42. Id.
43. Perlstein & Lee, supra note 36.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 77-80.
45. John M. Broder, Hurricane Katrina: Rescue Efforts; Guard Units' New Mission: From
Combat To Flood Duty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,2005, at A13.
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only 2800 of the guardsmen had reached New Orleans by Thursday (three
days after landfall),4 and like the police, this initial deployment had more on
its plate than just security; food distribution, debris removal, power genera-
tion, and other tasks were also part of the Guard's post-Katrina mission, and
often took precedence over security.4' The Guard's efforts were further ham-
pered when its New Orleans barracks flooded.4' As a result, the Guard lost
twenty vehicles designed to carry soldiers through flooded streets and was
forced to abandon much of its most advanced communications equipment.49
Additionally, more than 5000 members of the Guard were deployed in Iraq
at the time Katrina hit, making them unavailable for duty within the state.'0
Other resources, too, were in the Middle East-after Katrina, the Louisiana
Guard had only one satellite phone for use on the entire Gulf Coast, because
the others were in Iraq."
The end result of the violence and the lack of security was a city in "an-
archy," as one Louisiana state representative labeled New Orleans in the
days following Katrina.5' Even in the Superdome and the Convention Cen-
ter, where city officials had instructed those unable to leave New Orleans to
gather during and after the storm, the situation was "completely lawless,"
with numerous reports of murders, rapes, and robberies.53
B. Debate Over the Military's Role
As the lawlessness spread, state and federal officials began debating
whether New Orleans was a job for the United States military. On the eve-
ning of Tuesday, August 30, the Pentagon established a special command
center at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, to coordinate the military's rescue and
relief efforts along the Gulf Coast.54 As will be discussed below, the military,
pursuant to the Stafford Act, is authorized to perform a host of rescue-and-
relief tasks after a natural disaster.5 The special command center, called
46. Tom Bowman, La. governor requests 40,000 Guard troops: Soldiers would provide secu-
rity in New Orleans, BALT. SUN, Sept. 2, 2005, at 6A; see also Carl Hiaasen, Guard's in Iraq, but
it's needed here, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 4, 2005, at LI.
47. Broder, supra note 45.
48. Eric Lipton et al., Storm and Crisis: Government Assistance; Breakdowns Marked Path
From Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at 1 [hereinafter Lipton, Government Assis-
tance].
49. Id.
50. See Hiaasen, supra note 46.
51. Gene Healy, What of 'Posse Comitatus'?: Soldiers don't make very good police officers,
AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 7, 2005 at B2.
52. Paul Purpura & Ed Anderson, Blanco demands thousands of troops, TImES-PICAYUNE,
Sept. 2, 2005, at AI (quoting State Representative Jim Tucker).
53. See Lipton, Government Assistance, supra note 48.
54. Eric Lipton & Eric Schmitt, Hurricane Katrina: Emergency Responders: Navy Ships and
Maritime Rescue TeamsAre Sent to Region, N.Y TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A14.
55. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
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"Joint Task Force Katrna, was headed by Louisiana native and three-star
Army Lt. General Russel L. Honore.57 General Honore was charged with
directing federal assets--equipment, troops, rations-in support of the Fed-
eral Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") and Louisiana state
officials, including the Louisiana National Guard. When President Bush
ordered 7000 active-duty military members to Louisiana on September 3,
those troops were under General Honore's command.5" Their mission in-
cluded search and rescue; transporting medical equipment to hospitals;
delivering water, fuel and food to those who needed it; and evacuating citi-
zens from New Orleans and other hard-hit areas.59 But the mission explicitly
did not include performing law enforcement functions. General Honore later
noted in his memoir that the PCA restricted his troops from performing law
enforcement functions: "[A]ctive-duty troops are able to assist and provide
support to civil authorities in times of disaster .... [T]hey cannot do law
enforcement. '6°
But behind the scenes, the White House was considering invoking the
Insurrection Act so that members of the military, in addition to performing
rescue-and-relief operations, could also directly participate in law enforce-
ment efforts inside New Orleans. On Wednesday, August 31, in an hour-long
meeting at the White House, President Bush and his senior aides discussed
at length the looting and law enforcement problems in New Orleans, and
considered invoking the Insurrection Act to give the military a direct role,
61
under the command of the president, in restoring order. While the meeting
adjourned with the group deciding not to take such a step, the Pentagon did
put active-duty troops on alert, ready to be deployed to New Orleans to per-
62form law enforcement tasks if the need arose.
Discussions between the White House and the Blanco Administration
about whether the military was needed for law enforcement continued
throughout the week, culminating in a series of intense discussions on Fri-
day and Saturday, including a face-to-face meeting between the president
and the governor aboard Air Force One on Friday afternoon.63 Professor
Greenberger provides the following account of the ongoing discussions be-
tween Washington and Baton Rouge:
56. See Jan Moiler & Robert Travis Scott, Appeals for Troops Unheeded for Days, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Sept. 9, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nola.comkatrina/pages/090905/l.pdf.
57. See CNN.com, Lt. Gen. Honore a 'John Wayne Dude', Sept. 3, 2005, http://
www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/02/honore.profile/index.html.
58. See Moller & Scott, supra note 56.
59. Transcript of Special Defense Department Briefing with Commander of Joint Task Force
Katrina (Sept. 1, 2005), http://www.defense.gov/transcipts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1955.
60. Russel L. Honore, Survival: How a Culture of Preparedness Can Save You and Your
Family From Disasters 15-16 (2009).
61. Richard W. Stevenson, Hurricane Katrina: Federal Response: Administration Steps up
Actions, Adding Troops and Dispatching Medical Supplies, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 1, 2005, at A21.
62. Id.
63. Moller & Scott, supra note 56.
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Both President Bush and White House Chief of Staff Andy Card pressed
Governor Blanco to request a federal takeover of the relief effort so that
federal troops could be deployed to restore law and order... These ap-
peasing measures at that stage of crisis were thought to be necessary
because the Bush administration then believed that the PCA barred de-
ployment of troops to restore order. The investigation into the legality of
invoking the Insurrection Act ... led to "a flurry of meetings at the Justice
Department, the White House and other agencies" and erupted into a
"fierce debate." The White House instructed the Justice Department's Of-
fice of Legal Counsel... to resolve the issue. The OLC finally "concluded
that the federal government had authority to move in even over the objec-
tion of local officials." 64
Despite this conclusion from the Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC") that
the president had legal authority to invoke the Insurrection Act over the ob-
jections of Governor Blanco, the Bush Administration chose not to do so,
and the PCA continued to bar the military from engaging in law enforce-
ment. As will be discussed in greater detail in Part II, federalism concerns
played a substantial role in the White House's decision not to invoke the Act
unilaterally.
C. The Federalism Concerns Behind the PCA,
the Insurrection Act, and the Stafford Act
The following subsections briefly trace the historical roots of the triad of
laws that governs the military's involvement in natural disaster response: the
PCA, the Insurrection Act, and the Stafford Act. The subsections also iden-
tify the core federalism concerns that underlie each of these laws.
1. The Posse Comitatus Act
This subsection proceeds in three parts-first, it discusses the historical
background of the PCA; then, it defines the scope of the PCA; and lastly, it
explores the policy rationale behind the Act.
a. The History of the PCA
Prior to the PCA's passage in 1878, there was no clear legal barrier to
using the military to enforce domestic laws.65 Indeed, between the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution in 1789 and the passage of the PCA almost ninety
years later, the use of the Army and other military personnel for domestic
64. Michael Greenberger, Yes, Virginia: The President Can Deploy Federal Troops to Prevent
the Loss of a Major American City from a Devastating Natural Catastrophe, 26 Miss. C. L. REv.
107, 114-15 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
65. Susan W. Brenner, "At Light Speed": Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/
Terrorism/Warfare, 97 J. Cium. L. & CRIWNOLOGY 379, 442-43 (2007).
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law enforcement purposes was commonplace. 66 Before the Civil War, for
example, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 authorized the use of military per-
sonnel to enforce the law's mandate that fugitive slaves be returned to their
67
masters. Following the Civil War, under the terms of the 1871 Ku Klux
Klan Act, the military was granted virtually unrestrained power to combat
the Klan and intervene in areas where it gained a significant foothold. 6 Mili-
tary law enforcement reached its apex during Reconstruction when, in the
former Confederate states, Union soldiers performed tasks ranging from tax
collection to labor conflict suppression, to preventing illegal liquor produc-
tion.69
By 1876, however, southern states had grown weary of the military's
ubiquitous presence in day-to-day life. Even northerners were outraged
when, on three separate occasions, federal troops occupied the Louisiana
State Legislature, "marching into the hall and expelling members at the
point of the bayonet. ' 70 The presidential election of 1876 proved the death
knell for military law enforcement. Republican Rutherford B. Hayes defeated
Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, winning the electoral votes of three key southern
states: Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina.7' In all three of those states,
thousands of U.S. military troops had been deployed by incumbent
Republican president, Ulysses S. Grant, to "preserve peace and prevent in-
timidation of the voters"--which to many in the South was merely a
euphemism for voter fraud on behalf of Hayes. On the same day that
Hayes, after a long dispute, was awarded the presidency, southern Democ-
rats in Congress attached an amendment to an Army appropriations bill,
prohibiting military funds from being used in "support... of any state gov-
ernment or office thereof."73 That particular amendment stalled in
66. Nathan Canestaro, Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus,
12 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 109-10 (2003); see also Sean J. O'Hara, Comment, The Posse Comi-
tatus Act Applied to the Prosecution of Civilians, 53 U. KAN, L. REv. 767, 771-72 (2005)
(discussing the federal military's role in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law, and the large-scale mili-
tary law enforcement presence in the Reconstruction South from 1865 to 1877); Isaac Tekie, Note,
Bringing the Troops Home to a Disaster: Law, Order, and Humanitarian Relief 67 OH. ST. L.J.
1227, 1232 (2006) ("[B]efore the PCA, U.S. Marshals across the country had the power to summon
army members in their territory to arrest criminals and carry out other law enforcement activities.").
67. Canestaro, supra note 66, at Il l; see also O'Hara, supra note 66, at 771.
68. Canestaro, supra note 66, at 112.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1863-77 234
(1990)).
71. Id. at 113; see also H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed by the
Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MIL. L. REv. 85, 94-95 (1960).
72. Canestaro, supra note 66, at 113 (quoting Furman, supra note 71, at 95); see also Jason
Mazzone, The Commandeerer in Chief, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 265, 288 (2007) (noting that the
PCA was enacted "out of opposition to federal troops' activities (including guarding polling sta-
tions) in the South during Reconstruction").
73. Canestaro, supra note 66, at 113 (quoting John D. Gates, Don't Call Out the Marines: An
Assessment of the Posse Comitatus Act, 13 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1467, 1473 (1982)).
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committee, but two years later, Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act,
and it was signed into law by President Hayes on June 18, 1878.74
b. The Scope of the PCA
Because the PCA was passed as an amendment to the Army Authoriza-
tion Act, it has been interpreted to apply only to the Army and Air Force,
although Defense Department rules effectively apply the restrictions to the
Navy as well." The Coast Guard is exempt from the Act and routinely per-
76forms traditional law enforcement functions.
The PCA's application to the National Guard is more complex. When an
individual enlists in a particular state's guard, that individual enlists simul-
taneously in the U.S. National Guard." Under this "dual enlistment"
provision, a member of the Guard can be acting either in service of the
78member's state or in federal service. When acting in the former capacity,
the Guard member is under the command and control of the state governor;
when acting in the latter capacity, the member is under the command and
control of the president.79 When a Guard member is called into federal ser-
vice, the member is relieved of his or her status in the State Guard.0 The
PCA applies to members of the National Guard only when the members are
operating in federal service; it does not apply to members when operating
under the command and control of a state governor. Thus, Governor Blanco
could legally deploy members of the Louisiana National Guard to New Or-
leans to arrest looters. Had those same members of the Guard been called
into federal service, under the command and control of President Bush, they
would not have been authorized to arrest looters, unless they had been fed-
eralized as part of a declaration of insurrection.
c. The Policy Rationale Behind the PCA
The PCA is partly founded on the idea that military personnel are
trained to act in circumstances where defeat of the enemy, rather than the
protection of constitutional freedoms, is the paramount concern; and that
applying such a mindset to domestic law enforcement would be a significant
74. Id. at 113-14.
75. Clarence 1. Meeks I1, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of
the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. REv. 83, 100-01 (1975); see also DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM
CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW 40-41 (2006).
76. Canestaro, supra note 66, at 124 n.183.
77. Pepich v. Dep't. ofDef., 496 U.S. 334, 345 (1990).
78. Id. at 346.
79. See William C. Banks, The Normalization of Homeland Security After September 11: The
Role of the Military in Counterterrorism Preparedness and Response, 64 LA. L. REv. 735, 764-65
(2004).
80. Pepich, 496 U.S. at 346.
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"danger" to the rights of Americans."' Or, as it has been more bluntly put:
"[L]aw enforcement personnel search and capture, while the military search
and destroy.""s The Fourth Circuit recently declared the restriction on mili-
tary intrusion into civilian affairs an "American tradition" to be violated
only when "Congress has recognized a special need for military assis-
tance.
,8 ,
But, as evidenced by its origins in the Reconstruction South, federalism
is the real bedrock of the PCA. By making state and local governments re-
sponsible for law enforcement, and excluding members of the military from
usurping that responsibility, the PCA preserves and protects the independ-
ence of the states and their police powers.4 Indeed, much of the scholarly
literature discussing the PCA has, in no uncertain terms, recognized the core
federalism concerns that underlie the Act. The Act has been described as a
"symbol of federalism";8 ' as Congress's "expression of constitutional law
regarding federalism"; 86 as a "central tenet of democratic federalism"; 87 and
as a bulwark against "the degradation of our treasured checks and balances
and the very concepts of federalism and freedom."
2. The Insurrection Act
As noted above, the PCA authorizes Congress to create express statutory
exceptions to the Act, empowering Congress to define situations in which
the military may be used to perform traditional law enforcement functions.
The most notable statutory exception is the Insurrection Act. Congress
passed the Insurrection Act in 1807, pursuant to its power under Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, to "provide for calling forth the Militia to exe-
cute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." 9
Through the Insurrection Act, Congress empowered the president to both
81. United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 193-94 (D.N.D. 1975) ("It is the nature of
their primary mission that military personnel must be trained to operate under circumstances where
the protection of constitutional freedoms cannot receive the consideration needed in order to assure
their preservation. The posse comitatus statute is intended to meet that danger.").
82. MARK C. WESTON, U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, REVIEW OF
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA 1, 16 (2006), http://www.
docstoc.com/docs/2409683/REVIEW-OF-THE-POSSE-COMITATUS-ACT-AFFER-HURRICANE-
KATRINA.
83. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 146-47 (4th Cir. 2005).
84. Maggs, supra note 12, at 670.
85. Daniel J. Sennott, Interpreting Recent Changes to the Standing Rules for the Use of
Force, ARMy LAW., Nov. 2007, at 52, 75.
86. Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight on
124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage is Done, 175 MIL. L. REV.
86, 167 (2003).
87. Tekie, supra note 66, at 1232.
88. Christopher H. Lytton, America's Borders and Civil Liberties in a Post-September lth
World, 12J. TiANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 197, 204 (2003).
89. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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deploy members of the U.S. military and federalize members of a state's
national guard under certain circumstances. 90
The Insurrection Act recognizes three circumstances under which the
president may take such steps. The first occurs when the state government,
through either the legislature or the governor, expressly requests that the
president do so.9' The second occurs when the president determines that
forces within a state have made it "impracticable to enforce the laws of the
,92United States." The third occurs when citizens of a state are "deprived of a
right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and se-
cured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State are unable, fail, or
refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity."93 Only the first circum-
stance requires the state government to request federal assistance; in the
other two, the president invokes the Act unilaterally.94 While invocation of
the Act is rare, more rare is invocation without a request from the state gov-
ernment. The last time the Act was invoked was in 1992, when at the request
of California Governor Pete Wilson, President George H.W. Bush dis-
patched 4000 soldiers and Marines to Los Angeles to quell the Rodney King
riots.9 President Bush also used the Act in September 1989, when the
90. 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-33 (2006).
91. The language of § 331 reads, in full:
§ 331. Federal aid for State governments[:] Whenever there is an insurrection in any State
against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its governor
if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service such of the militia of the other
States, in the number requested by that State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers
necessary to suppress the insurrection.
10 U.S.C. § 331.
92. The language of § 332 reads, in full:
§ 332. Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority[:] Whenever the President
considers that unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in
any State by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such
of the militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to en-
force those laws or to suppress the rebellion.
10 U.S.C. § 332.
93. The language of § 333 reads, in full:
§ 333. Interference with State and Federal law: The President, by using the militia or the armed
forces, or both, or by any other means, shall take such measures as he considers necessary to
suppress, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy,
if it--() so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the United States within the
State, that any part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immunity, or protec-
tion named in the Constitution and secured by law, and the constituted authorities of that State
are unable, fail, or refuse to protect that right, privilege, or immunity, or to give that protection;
or (2) opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course
of justice under those laws. In any situation covered by clause (1), the State shall be considered
to have denied the equal protection of the laws secured by the Constitution.
10 U.S.C. § 333.
94. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text.
95. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 75, at 47; Robert Bums, U.S. Looks at Role for Military;
Some Want to Change Law to Permit Using Soldiers in Disasters, CHI. SUN TMES, Sept. 18, 2005,
at 15.
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governor of the Virgin Islands requested military help to put down looting
that broke out following Hurricane Hugo (in a situation that closely paral-
leled post-Katrina New Orleans). 96 But since the Civil War, the Insurrection
Act has only been invoked without the request of a state's government for
one purpose-to effectuate school desegregation in the South in the 1950s
and 1960s. 97
The PCA implicates federalism by protecting the states' authority to per-
form domestic law enforcement functions; the Insurrection Act implicates
the other side of the federalism coin by allowing the military to intrude into
the state's law enforcement sphere when the national interest so demands.
Congress, in passing the Insurrection Act, recognized that in certain situa-
tions the necessity of military law enforcement overrides the state
sovereignty considerations underlying the PCA.98 As the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals wrote, "[I]n certain circumstances, military preservation
and enforcement of civilian law is appropriate; the policy consideration un-
derlying the Posse Comitatus Act is not absolute." 99
3. The Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster and Relief Emergency Act ("Stafford
Act")m°° defines the federal government's role in disaster relief efforts.
Passed by Congress in 1974, the Act aims "to provide an orderly and con-
tinuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local
governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the 'suffering
and damage which result from such disasters."'0 ' Under the terms of the
Stafford Act, the governor of a state affected by a natural disaster may re-
quest that the president declare a "major disaster area" or a state of
"emergency. ' 2 Once the governor makes such a request, and once the
president acquiesces, a panoply of federal assistance becomes available to
the state, including money, food, medical supplies, health and safety infor-
96. Hearing on the Readiness of the Army and Air National Guard Before the S. Judiciary
Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum, National Guard Bureau), avail-
able at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2713&witid=6391.
97. Lipton, Military Response, supra note 14. President Eisenhower used the Insurrection
Act in 1957 to enforce school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, and President Kennedy used
the Act in 1962 and 1963 to enforce desegregation in Mississippi and Alabama, respectively. Sio-
bhan Morrisey, Should the Military be Called in for Natural Disasters?, TIME.COM, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1869089,00.html.
98. See Jessica DeBianchi, Note, Military Law: Winds of Change-Examining the Present-
Day Propriety of the Posse Comitatus Act After Hurricane Katrina, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
473, 488-89 (2006).
99. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 377 n.11 (4th Cir. 1974).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (2006).
101. Id. § 5121(b).
102. Christina E. Wells, Katrina and the Rhetoric of Federalism, 26 Miss. C. L. REV. 127, 132
(2006); see also Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Construction and Application of Robert T Staf-
ford Disaster Relief and Emergency Act (Stafford Act), 42 US.C.A. §§ 5121 et seq., 14 A.L.R. FED.
2D 173 (2006).
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mation, and search-and-rescue personnel and equipment. 103 FEMA is the
federal agency responsible for funneling this assistance to the affected states
and localities.' °4
Part of the panoply of federal assistance that becomes available to a state
after the "emergency" or "disaster" declaration has been made is military
assistance. The Stafford Act authorizes the Department of Defense ("DOD")
to provide local authorities with "personnel, equipment, supplies, facilities,
and managerial, technical and advisory services."1 °5 Thus, because Governor
Blanco requested federal help under the Stafford Act before Katrina hit,'0
6
members of the military under General Honore's command were able to
assist in evacuations, deliver food and water, and perform search and rescue
missions. °7 But the Stafford Act is not an exception to the PCA, and so mili-
tary personnel deployed to a disaster area under its terms are prohibited
from engaging in law enforcement.'08 Put differently, a governor's request
for assistance under the Stafford Act is not a request for military assistance
with law enforcement. If the governor wants military help with law en-
forcement, she must make that request under Section 331 of the Insurrection
Act.
Like the PCA and the Insurrection Act, the Stafford Act is animated by
federalism principles. The Act places the primary responsibility for disaster
recovery on the states. °9 As Richard Falkenrath, a former homeland security
adviser to President George W. Bush, noted, "The basic federal compact ...
is that the state and local agencies are responsible for disaster relief and
management, and the federal government is just there to help as asked.""0
By granting state and local governments primary authority for disaster re-
lief, and by placing limitations on the powers of the federal government
within the disaster-relief sphere, the "language and structure of the [Stafford
Act] clearly embody federalism principles.' Congress itself recognized
103. Wells, supra note 102, at 133.
104. Id.
105. Christopher B. Walters, Responding to National Disasters and Emergencies: A Contract
and Fiscal Law Primer, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2007, at 35, 37.
106. Joshua M. Samek, Note, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: A Case for Repeal
of the Posse Comitatus Act of a Case for Learning the Law?, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 441,460 (2007).
107. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
108. See Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. REv.
67, 82 (2000) ("The Stafford Act is not an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, primarily because
actions taken under the Stafford Act should not involve law enforcement activities."); Samek, supra
note 106, at 459 ("Although the Stafford Act authorizes the use of the military to respond to both
major disasters and emergencies even before they may be declared, the Stafford Act does not consti-
tute an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act.").
109. Susan L. Waysdorf, Returning to New Orleans: Reflections on the Post-Katrina Recov-
ery Disaster Relief and the Struggle for Social Justice, 12 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 3, 37 (2009).
110. Interview by PBS Frontline with Richard Falkenrath, Former Deputy Homeland Security
Advisor, Department of Homeland Security (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/storm/interviews/falkenrath.html.
111. Wells, supra note 102, at 132; see also Ross C. Paolino, Is it Safe to Chevron
"Two-Step" in a Hurricane? A Critical Examination of How Expanding the Government's Role in
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these federalism principles in the Stafford Act's Congressional Findings:
"[E]mbedded in the Stafford Act are principles of federalism and dual sov-
ereignty. With rare exception, the management of a disaster is reserved to
the affected state, unless and until the state actively seeks federal assis-
tance.""
2
II. THE FEDERALISM CHECK ON THE PRESIDENT'S
INSURRECTION ACT POWERS
Part II makes two arguments: first, in Part II.A., that the Bush Admini-
stration, despite having the legal authority to invoke the Insurrection Act
after Katrina, decided against doing so because of federalism concerns; and
second, in Part II.B, that the changes Congress made to the Insurrection Act
in the years after Katrina reinforced the federalism check on the president's
Insurrection Act powers.
A. Katrina and Federalism Concerns
In the days following Katrina, federalism concerns were prominent in
the debate between the White House and Governor Blanco's office over
what role, if any, the U.S. military should play in policing New Orleans.
And while other factors played a role,"3 the Bush Administration's decision
not to invoke the Insurrection Act was substantially driven by federalism
concerns. In particular, the Bush Administration feared that invoking the Act
without Governor Blanco's consent would be-or at least would appear to
be-an unwarranted intrusion on Louisiana's sovereignty.
As the security situation in New Orleans deteriorated, and as it became
evident that local police were incapable of maintaining law and order inside
the city,1 4 the Bush Administration began to press Governor Blanco to re-
Disaster Relief Will Only Exacerbate the Damage, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1398-99 (2008)
(identifying the "federalism-based 'pull' model of disaster relief"); Mary J. Bradley, et al., The Posse
Comitatus Act: Does it Impact the Department of Defense during Consequence Management Opera-
tions?, ARMY LAW., Oct. 2007, at 68, 70 (recognizing the "principles of federalism embodied in the
Stafford Act").
112. Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of Insurance: Federal-
ism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 835, 858 (2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5170,
5191 (b) (2000)).
113. It should be noted that there were important logistical concerns that factored into the
White House's thinking. Some in the White House, for example, believed that active duty military
would not arrive in New Orleans until after members of the Louisiana National Guard and guards-
men from other states. See Lipton, Military Response, supra note 14. But, according to one report in
the New York 71mes, a senior army officer "expressed puzzlement that active-duty troops were not
summoned sooner, saying 82nd Airborne troops were ready to move out from Fort Bragg, N.C." on
the Sunday before Katrina hit. Id. Either way, by Saturday, September 3, more than 4500 active duty
federal military troops were in the Gulf Coast. That number increased to more than 7000 by Sunday,
September 4. See id. Other federal officials worried that members of the military were not ade-
quately trained to handle law enforcement functions inside New Orleans. Lipton, Government
Assistance, supra note 48 (quoting a Pentagon official noting that members of the military were
untrained in the law enforcement techniques that would have been required in New Orleans).
114. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
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quest a law enforcement role for the military."' Under the terms of the
Insurrection Act, a request from a state government allows the military to
operate outside the confines of the PCA and perform traditional law en-
forcement functions.' 6 But such a request would have required the
Louisiana National Guard to be federalized and placed under the command
of President Bush. According to multiple reports, Governor Blanco was
unwilling to cede control of the Guard to the present;"' she was particu-
larly concerned with undermining the authority of Major General
Landreneau, who was leading the Louisiana Guard's response to Katnna.
The governor's office also feared that by ceding authority to the president,
the Louisiana state government would be blamed for the failed response to
Katrina. According to one of the governor's aides: "Quite frankly, if [the
Bush Administration had] been able to pull off taking it from the locals, they
then could have blamed everything on the locals."" 9
With the Bush Administration hesitant to act without the governor's re-
quest, and the governor reluctant to give up control of the Louisiana
National Guard, discussions between the two sides became a "battle[] over
federalism."' 20 Both sides were sensitive to issues of state authority-the
Bush Administration reluctant to intrude on that authority, the governor's
office seeking to preserve it. Four days after Katrina hit, these concerns
were manifest at a meeting aboard Air Force One attended by President
Bush, Governor Blanco, Mayor Nagin, Homeland Security Director
Chertoff, and several members of Louisiana's congressional delegation. Ac-
cording to Mayor Nagin, the crux of the discussion between state and
federal officials was "'who has ultimate authority' and whether the federal
government is going to come in and impinge upon the state's authority."''
And it was Mayor Nagin-whose city remained in chaos while the governor
and the president debated the issue of state authority-who brought that
debate to a head aboard Air Force One. According to one account:
Everyone at the meeting was aware of the tension between the president
and the governor over the troops issue. Perhaps Ray Nagin saw his role as
that of the stick of dynamite that could break the logjam, because the
mayor ... lost his temper, slammed his hand down on the table, and in-
sisted that a chain of command needed to be established.... [H]e had
forced the president and governor to resolve their differences. Bush and
115. Greenberger, supra note 64, at 114.
116. See supra Section I.C.1.
117. See Lipton, Military Response, supra note 14; Moller & Travis, supra note 58.
118. Moller & Scott, supra note 56.
119. MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER 104 (2006) (quoting Manuel Roig-
Franzia & Spence Hsu, Many Evacuated, but Thousands Still Waiting: White House Shifts Blame to
State and Local Officials, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al).
120. Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution After
Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 164 (2006).
121. Interview by PBS Frontline with Ray Nagin, Mayor, New Orleans (Oct. 26, 2005),
available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/stormi/interviews/nagin.html.
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Blanco repaired to a separate section of the plane, and the governor, still
concerned with state-versus-federal distinctions, agreed to respond within
24 hours [to requests to federalize the National Guard]. '2'
As this debate unfolded, the Bush Administration was also considering
its other option under the Insurrection Act: deploying troops to perform law
enforcement functions without the governor's request. 23 In 1827, twenty
years after the Insurrection Act became law, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the president's legal authority under the Insurrection Act is plenary,
writing that "the authority to decide whether [an] exigency has arisen, be-
longs exclusively to the President, and ... his decision is conclusive upon
all other persons."' 24 This holding, combined with the plain language of the
statute'25 and previous historical usage of the Act,126 suggest that the presi-
dent has clear authority to invoke the Act without a request from the state
government. Following Katrina, the OLC concluded that the president had
the legal authority to invoke the Act "even over the objections of local offi-
cials."'27 Indeed, even in cases where a state has not requested that the Act be
invoked, "there has never been a serious argument advanced that it is uncon-
stitutional to use federal troops when the states and localities are wholly
incapable of enforcing law and maintaining order."''2 And the conditions on
the ground in New Orleans seemed to justify invocation of the Act.9
By Saturday morning, Governor Blanco decided that she would not re-
quest a federal military law enforcement presence."o This left the Bush
Administration with a decision: invoke the Insurrection Act unilaterally or
forgo the military law enforcement presence in New Orleans that it had been
pressing Governor Blanco to accept. The White House chose the latter; con-
122. Douglas Brinkley, How New Orleans Drowned, VANITY FAIR, June 2006 (excerpting
DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE (2006)), http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/
2006/06/Brinkley-excerpt20060.
123. Greenberger, supra note 64, at 114-15; Susan B. Glasser & Michael Grunwald, The
Steady Buildup to a City's Chaos: Confusion Reigned At Every Level Of Government, WASH. POST,
Sept. 11, 2005, at Al (describing internal White House discussions, in the days after Katrina, over
invoking the Act without Governor Blanco's request).
124. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 30 (1827).
125. See supra notes 91-93.
126. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
128. Michael Greenberger, Did the Founding Fathers Do "A Heckuva Job"? Constitutional
Authorization for the Use of Federal Troops To Prevent the Loss of a Major American City, 87 B.U.
L. REv. 397, 418 (2007).
129. Id. ("The complete breakdown of orderly state and local government services within
New Orleans during Katrina, and the chaos that ensued, clearly invited use of the Insurrection Act
... insofar as neither the state nor local governments were able to protect even the most basic civil
rights of New Orleans residents."); see also E.L. Gaston, Taking the Gloves off of Homeland Secu-
rity: Rethinking the Federalism Framework for Responding to Domestic Emergencies, I HARv. L. &
POL'y REv. 519, 526 (2007) ("Given the deteriorating public order in New Orleans, the President
could also have relied on the Insurrection Act ... to send federal troops to help restore order and
provide emergency assistance.").
130. Moller & Scott, supra note 56.
1328 [Vol. 108:1309
A New Exception to the Posse Comitatus Act
cerns over the legal and political fallout that a unilateral invocation of the
Act would have generated played a substantial and perhaps dispositive role
in this choice. 3' Despite the conclusions of the OLC opinion, the Bush Ad-
ministration remained concerned that an invocation of the Act would disrupt
the constitutionally prescribed balance between the state and federal gov-
ernments. Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff articulated those concerns
two days after Katrina made landfall: "Under the Constitution, state and
local authorities have the principal first line of response obligation....
[T]he federal government does not supersede the state and local govern-
ment."'132 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld later echoed that sentiment: "The
way it's arranged under our Constitution . .. state and local officials are the
first responders.' 3' At least ostensibly, the Bush Administration was con-
cerned about the constitutional implications of overriding Louisiana's
authority.
But as noted above, federalism is both a legal and a political principle.
Federalism leaves it to the people, through the political process, to deter-
mine whether the federal government has exceeded its authority and
impinged on the authority of the states."' And, as it considered whether or
not to invoke the Insurrection Act without Governor Blanco's request, the
Bush Administration appeared to be acutely aware that an uninvited intru-
sion on Louisiana's sovereignty might be a politically unpopular move. 136
Paul McHale, the assistant secretary of defense for homeland security, de-
scribed the administration's concerns in the following way: "Could we have
physically moved combat forces into an American city, without the gover-
nor's consent, for purposes of using those forces ... for law enforcement
duties? Yes.... Would you have wanted that on your conscience?"'3 An-
other senior administration official, speaking anonymously to the New York
Times in the days after the storm, asked, "Can you imagine how it would have
been perceived if a president of the United States of one party had preemp-
tively taken from the female governor of another party the command and
control of her forces ... ?"" One journalist, writing shortly after Katrina,
suggested that the Bush Administration's decision not to invoke the Act may
have been informed by "a political calculation that many Republicans,
131. See Gaston, supra note 129, at 525 (stating that a "hesitancy to erode federalism" drove
the choice).
132. Mazzone, supra note 72, at 269.
133. Lipton, Government Assistance, supra note 48.
134. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 9.
136. Lipton, Government Assistance, supra note 48 ("Pentagon, White House and Justice
officials debated for two days whether the president should seize control of the relief mission from
Governor Blanco. But they worried about the political fallout of stepping on the state's authority,
according to officials involved in the discussions.").
137. Id.
138. Lipton, Military Response, supra note 14.
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especially Southerners, would not react happily to the sight of troops enter-
ing Louisiana over the objections of local officials."'3 9
Ultimately, the Bush Administration decided against invoking the Insur-
rection Act. Whatever the Administration's exact motives, it is clear that
federalism played a central role in this decision. The Administration's un-
willingness to invoke the Act, and the state's unwillingness to request its
usage, both sprang from an overriding concern for state sovereignty. Feder-
alism's other concern-enabling the federal government to act when
national action is desired-was subjugated, even as local and state officials
proved unable to protect "the most basic civil rights of New Orleans resi-
dents."'0
B. Congress Strengthens the Federalism Check
Within weeks of Katrina, both the White House and members of Con-
gress began suggesting that changes needed to be made to the PCA and the
Insurrection Act. President Bush, speaking to the nation from New Orleans'
Jackson Square two weeks after Katrina made landfall, declared that "a
challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role
for the armed forces."'14' Two days prior, Senator Warner, at the time the
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, spoke on the Senate
floor and argued that the PCA needed to be changed to better meet "a con-
tingency of the nature we have experienced."'
42
A little over a year later, in September 2006, Congress passed legislation
that amended the Insurrection Act to give the president explicit authority to
deploy the military for law enforcement purposes following a natural disas-
ter, with or without a governor's consent ("Warner Amendment"). Under the
Warner Amendment's new language, the president was granted the explicit
authority to both deploy federal military forces and federalize members of a
state's national guard when, "as a result of a natural disaster .. . the Presi-
dent determines that ... domestic violence has occurred to such an extent
that the constituted authorities of the State or possession are incapable of
maintaining public order.
' 143
Supporters of the Warner Amendment contended it did not expand the
president's Insurrection Act powers; rather, it simply made explicit that the
Act could be invoked following a natural disaster. When the Warner
Amendment reached the Senate floor for debate, Senator Ted Kennedy la-
beled it a gap filler: "While the [A]mendment does not grant the President
any new powers, it fills an important gap in clarifying the President's au-
139. Lemann, supra note 18.
140. See Greenberger, supra note 128.
141. Greenberger, supra note 64, at 116.
142. 151 CONG. REc. S9945-47, (daily ed. Sept. 13, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Warner).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 333(a)(i) (2006) (amended 2006).
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thority to respond to these new kinds of emergencies."'4 Scholars have sub-
sequently endorsed this view that the Warner Amendment merely
"codifie[d] and clarifie[d] the federal power that existed prior to its enact-
ment."145 But not everyone agreed with this interpretation. Senator Leahy-
the Warner Amendment's most outspoken critic before and after its
passage-blasted it as a "raw expansion of Presidential power ... There is
certainly something going on that is far more than a clarification."'
46
Whether or not the Warner Amendment actually expanded the presi-
dent's Insurrection Act powers, Senator Leahy is correct that it "change[d]
the way we perceive the law and the way it could be interpreted"' 47 Indeed,
the Warner Amendment created a perception that issues of state sovereignty
and authority should be subordinated to federal power on occasions where
invocation of the Insurrection Act might be appropriate. This perception
fueled criticism of the Warner Amendment by groups representing state in-
terests. "Governors need to be focused on assisting their citizens during an
emergency instead of looking over their shoulders to see if the federal gov-
emnment is going to step in," said the homeland security adviser to the
National Governor's Association.1 48 The National Sheriff's Association-the
largest association of law enforcement professionals in the United States-
called the Warner Amendment "an unwarranted diminution of state and lo-
cal power."' 49
The backlash against the Warner Amendment, led by governors and state
and local law enforcement groups, was motivated in large measure by a de-
sire to preserve state authority.5° This sentiment also motivated efforts to
repeal the Amendment. Senator Leahy ascended to the chairmanship of the
Senate Judiciary Committee after the Democratic Party won a congressional
majority in the 2006 midterm elections. 5' Calling the Warner Amendment
"bad policy" that made it more likely "that the military will be inserted into
domestic situations," Senator Leahy held a number of hearings aimed at
144. 152 CONG. REc. S10806, (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
145. E.g., Greenberger, supra note 64, at 108.
146. "The Insurrection Act Rider" and State Control of the National Guard: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 38 (2007) (prepared opening statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary).
147. Id.
148. Kavan Peterson, Governors lose in power struggle over National Guard, STATE-
LINE.ORG., Jan. 12, 2007, http://www.stateline.orgllive/details/story?contentld=170453.
149. Letter from Ted Kamatchus, President, National Sheriff's Association, to Senators Pat-
rick Leahy and Christopher Bond (Feb. 20, 2007) (on file with author).
150. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal Triage Dur-
ing Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.YU. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 289 (2008) ("[Tlhe strong
reaction from the states and the subsequent demise of the [Warner Amendment] illustrate the vi-
brancy of the federalism concerns in this arena.").
151. John M. Broder, Democrats Take Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2006, atAl.
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repealing the Warner Amendment.52 On January 30, 2008, President Bush
signed a bill that included language repealing the Warner Amendment, less
than a year and a half after its passage.'53 The Warner Amendment's repeal
was a rejection of what was perceived to be the federal government's en-
croachment on state power. It was, in essence, a victory for states' rights.
Whether or not the Warner Amendment actually expanded the president's
authority, the mere perception that the Amendment made it easier for the
president to deploy troops domestically stoked the federalism concerns that
underlie the PCA. The Warner Amendment, by advancing this perception,
diluted the "federalism check" on the president's Insurrection Act power-
that is, the Amendment diluted the considerations of state sovereignty that
militate against invoking the Insurrection Act without a state government's
consent.
In repealing the Warner Amendment and rejecting the theory behind it,
Congress reinforced this federalism check on the president's power. But
there remains no "bright line for determining the appropriate use of federal
troops during major domestic natural disasters,',54 and, consequently, future
disaster response efforts may suffer from the same sort of confusion and
delay that occurred after Katrina. While the repeal of the Warner Amend-
ment recognized the state sovereignty side of the federalism coin, it ignored
the important federal interests that underlie the Insurrection Act. A new
approach that balances issues of state sovereignty against the advantages of
a more flexible role for military law enforcement in times of crisis is
needed.
III. A NEW STATUTORY EXCEPTION TO THE PCA
Katrina exposed a failure in the United States' disaster relief system. The
storm made landfall on Monday morning; it wasn't until Saturday that the
federal government made up its mind about whether or not to use the military
for law enforcement purposes inside New Orleans. Because of the objections
of Governor Blanco and the overriding state sovereignty concerns, the Bush
Administration decided against invoking the Insurrection Act and using the
military as police. Whether or not that decision was correct is largely irrele-
vant to this Note. More relevant is the flawed process by which the
Administration came to its decision-a process which slowed the govern-
ment's response to Katrina and negatively affected its quality.'"
152. "The Insurrection Act Rider" and State Control of the National Guard: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (opening statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman,
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) (on file with author).
153. Press Release, Statement from Sen. Patrick Leahy, Bush Signs Bill Enacting Leahy's
National Guard Empowerment Reforms, and Leahy's Repeal of the Insurrection Act Rider (Jan. 30,
2008) (on file with author).
154. Greenberger, supra note 128, at 424.
155. William Banks, Who's in Charge: The Role of the Military in Disaster Response, 26
Miss. C.L. REv. 75, 93 (2006).
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Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution empowers Congress to
"provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, sup-
press Insurrections and repel Invasions.' 56 This Clause gives Congress the
power to establish rules for deploying troops domestically to suppress insur-
rections. The core argument in Part III of this Note is that Congress should
use this power to create another statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus
Act, whereby the president can appeal to a specially created federal judicial
body (the "PCA Court") for a "warrant" to deploy troops domestically for
the purposes of performing law enforcement functions. The PCA Court
would grant the warrant if the conditions on the ground satisfied the re-
quirements of the Insurrection Act. The warrant, if issued, would authorize
the president to deploy the military for law enforcement purposes for a
specified period of time, within a broad geographic region. This exception
would neither limit the president's authority to invoke the Insurrection Act
unilaterally nor expand his current Insurrection Powers;'57 rather, it would
provide the president an alternate procedural mechanism for deploying
troops domestically.
Part III.A outlines the operational and structural contours of the pro-
posed PCA Court. Part III.B argues that the PCA Court appropriately
addresses the federalism concerns raised during and after Katrina. Part III.C
draws on historical material to justify the creation of this new court, recall-
ing the "judicial certification" requirement that the Second Congress of the
United States imposed on the president's ability to deploy troops domesti-
cally and applying the logic of the early Congresses to the current proposal.
Part III.D offers further policy justifications for the system proposed here.
A. The Structural and Operational Contours of the PCA Court
An appropriate model for the structural and operational contours of the
new PCA Court is the court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act ("FISA"). Congress passed FISA in 1978 to regulate the government's
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
157. The repeal of the Warner Amendment did not change the provisions of the Insurrection
Act authorizing the president to invoke the Act, without a request from a state government, when he
adjudges that an insurrection makes it "impracticable to enforce" federal law, 10 U.S.C. 332 (2006),
or when the insurrection deprives citizens of any right, privilege or immunity protected by the Con-
stitution, 10 U.S.C. 333. The repeal of the Warner Amendment restored the Insurrection Act to its
pre-Katrina state. As Professor Greenberger notes:
Even prior to the passage of the Warner Amendment, and even in cases where the states have
not invited federal intervention, there has never been a serious argument advanced that it is un-
constitutional to use federal troops when the states and localities are wholly incapable of
enforcing law and maintaining order.
Greenberger, supra note 128, at 418. Indeed, this power to invoke the Act without a state govern-
ment's request is required to protect constitutional rights when a state government intentionally
obstructs those rights, as was the case when Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy invoked the Act to
effectuate school integration in the South, over the active opposition of Southern governments. See
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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use of electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence assets."8 The goal of
FISA was to "balance the public's concern about an unfettered government
with the executive branch's need to collect foreign intelligence quickly and
in secret."'5"9 FISA is offered as a model here because the PCA Court would
have a similar goal-balancing the public's concern about an unfettered
federal government against the executive branch's need to quickly deploy
troops to perform domestic law enforcement functions in times of insurrec-
tion.
FISA requires that the government obtain a warrant from a statutorily
created FISA court ("FISC") before performing surveillance on suspected
foreign intelligence agents.' 60 FISC is staffed by eleven U.S. district court
judges appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 6' In order to
obtain a warrant, the government must meet certain criteria and make cer-
tain showings. Requests to FISC must be in writing and under oath, and
must be personally reviewed and approved by the attorney general.' 62 The
warrant will only be approved if the FISC judge finds probable cause that
the target is a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power, and that foreign
intelligence information is being sought. 63 The FISC hearings are held in
secret and ex parte, and the decisions are usually not published. 1
4
While the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of
FISA, the statute and the court it created have withstood numerous constitu-
tional challenges in the lower courts. '65 These courts have consistently
rejected claims that FISC is not a properly constituted Article III court, and
claims that because of its ex parte proceedings, it fails to meet the case or
controversy requirement of Article III.' 6
The basic contours of the FISA court could effectively be transferred to
the PCA Court proposed in this Note. The court could be staffed by an ap-
propriate number of U.S. district court judges, appointed by the Chief
Justice of the United States. Because warrant petitions would normally
originate in Washington, D.C., a large percentage of the judges on the PCA
Court should sit in districts within a short distance of that city, or on the
158. Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts,
FISA, CIPA and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 203, 219 (2006).
159. Daniel L. Pines, The Central Intelligence Agency's "Family Jewels": Legal Then? Legal
Now?, 84 IND. L.J. 637, 662 (2009).
160. Yaroshefsky, supra note 158, at 219.
161. Jeffrey . Addicott & Michael T. McCaul, The Protect America Act of 2007: A Frame-
work for Improving Intelligence Collection in the War on Terror, 13 TEx REv. L. & POL. 43, 47-48
(2008).
162. See Pines, supra note 159, at 663.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Sur-
veillance, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 90 (2000).
166. Id.
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D.C. District Court.167 At least one judge would be "on call" for a specific
period of time-say six weeks of the year-and while on call would be pre-
pared to hear an application at a moment's notice. Expedience would be a
central feature of the court, since it would only be effective if it could
quickly authorize or reject the warrant petition.
The president--or the attorney general or another agent of the executive
branch-would be authorized by statute to petition the court. A hearing.
would be conducted as quickly as possible. The proceeding would be ex
parte-only the executive branch would be represented. As in FISA pro-
ceedings, the burden would be on the government to demonstrate probable
cause that the state or local government in question is no longer capable of
enforcing the laws. If the government meets its burden, the judge would
then issue a warrant authorizing military personnel to perform traditional
law enforcement functions within the specified disaster area. If rejected, the
option of deploying troops under the warrant would be foreclosed, but the
president would still have recourse to a unilateral invocation of the Insurrec-
tion Act.
The standard that the PCA judge should apply when determining
whether or not to issue a warrant for the domestic deployment of troops is
the standard announced in the Insurrection Act itself: whether a disruption
within a state "so hinders the execution of the laws of that State, and of the
United States within the State, that any part or class of its people is deprived
of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the Constitution and
secured by law" and the authorities within the state are unable or unwilling
to protect those rights and privileges. In other words: are state and local
officials no longer capable of enforcing the law? FISA's probable cause
standard could be imported here. If the PCA Court finds probable cause to
believe that state and local officials are incapable of enforcing the law, then
the warrant petition should be granted; if not, it should be denied.
B. The PCA Court and Federalism Concerns
The PCA Court is designed to give the president a greater range of op-
tions when deciding whether to deploy troops domestically to perform
traditional law enforcement functions during a natural disaster or crisis of
similar scope. If the president believes that conditions within a state warrant
the deployment of troops for law enforcement, but the state government re-
fuses to request invocation of the Insurrection Act, the president would have
two options: 1) invoke the Insurrection Act unilaterally and deploy troops
167. The Patriot Act imposed a similar requirement on FISA judges; now, at least three of the
FISA court's eleven judges must reside within twenty miles of Washington, D.C. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (codified in
scattered titles and sections of the U.S.C.); see U.S. Courts Educational Outreach, The Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court and The Court of Final Review, http://www.uscourts.gov/
outreachltopics/fisa/courtofreviewhtml.
168. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
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into the state, or 2) seek a warrant from the PCA Court and, if granted, de-
ploy troops into the state. The theory behind the second option is that the
president might be more willing to deploy troops over the objections of a state
government if the deployment comes with a judicial stamp of approval. 169 The
president might be less concerned with offending states' rights if his deci-
sion to deploy troops is backed by the federal judiciary. The warrant, in
essence, gives him greater political cover.
Instinctively, making it easier for the president to deploy troops into
states for the purpose of performing traditional law enforcement functions
seems inconsistent with federalism concerns. But as has been discussed
throughout this Note, there are two sides to the federalism coin--one side
concerned with empowering the national government to act when necessary,
the other with protecting the states against unwarranted federal intervention.
"There are ... and always have been, two sides to federalism: not just pre-
serving state authority, but also enabling the federal government to act
where national action is desirable."'7 Federalism is offended not only when
the federal power is needlessly expanded, but also when it is unduly lim-
ited. '
This understanding of federalism is crucial to the proposed PCA Court.
Certainly, the states have a compelling interest in preventing the federal
military from performing law enforcement functions within their borders,
and the PCA protects that interest. But the Constitution explicitly empowers
,172the federal government to "suppress [i]nsurrections." Federal action to
quell insurrections is not only "desirable"-in fact, it is expressly authorized
by the Constitution. Thus, if federalism is as concerned with empowering
the national government to act as it is with protecting state autonomy, then
making it easier for the president to deploy troops to put down an insurrec-
tion is entirely appropriate. In those rare instances of insurrection,
federalism is best served by providing the federal government the ability
and tools to suppress the insurrection. The PCA Court provides the federal
government with another tool to do so.
Furthermore, the system proposed here would not expand the president's
substantive powers under the Insurrection Act. It would simply create a new
procedural mechanism by which the president could exercise those powers.
This procedural mechanism would aid the federal government in properly
exercising its constitutionally granted power to "suppress [i]nsurrections.'1
Its principal purpose would be to facilitate the president's ability to exercise
this power when appropriate. But, where the PCA judge refuses to issue a
warrant on the grounds that the probable cause standard has not been met,
169. See infra notes 185-193 and accompanying text.
170. Kramer, supra note 7, at 920.
171. Id. ("If circumstances changed in a way that enlarged the number of problems falling
within the purview of Congress, an interpretation that limited federal power to deal with them was
every bit as problematic as one needlessly expanding federal power.").
172. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.15.
173. Id.
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this procedure might have the ancillary effect of protecting state sovereignty
by dissuading the president from unilaterally invoking the Act. Thus, both
sides of the federalism coin are served.
C. A Historical Justification for the Proposed PCA Court
While the idea of involving the judiciary in the president's decision to
deploy troops seems foreign, it is not: the idea originated with the Second
Congress of the United States. In 1792, the Second Congress passed the
Calling Forth Act ("CFA"), which governed the president's authority to de-
ploy state militias during domestic emergencies. 74 The CFA was passed
pursuant to Congress's constitutional power to "provide for calling forth the
[m]ilitia to... suppress [iinsurrections and repel [i]nvasions," the same con-
stitutional power on which the Insurrection Act now rests .1' The CFA
created a "sliding scale" of authority under which the president could de-
ploy state militias during domestic emergencies. "When the country was
facing invasion, the President's discretionary authority was at its apex; how-
ever, when it came to enforcing the laws, the President's authority was at its
lowest ebb, requiring judicial authorization before it could be triggered
... ,,176 For purposes of enforcing domestic laws, the president could only
deploy troops after an associate Justice of the Supreme Court or federal dis-
trict judge found that enforcement of the laws was being obstructed by
"combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judi-
cial proceedings, or by the powers invested in the marshals."'7 7 Thus, before
the president could deploy troops, the CFA required a member of the judi-
cial branch to certify that conditions on the ground warranted deployment. 7
Shortly after the CFA was passed, President Washington invoked it to
deploy federal troops to respond to a collection of farmers in Pennsylvania
refusing to pay a whiskey excise tax. 79 On August 7, 1794, in his "Whiskey
Rebellion Proclamation," President Washington declared that Justice Wilson
had certified that "in the counties of Washington and Allegheny, in Pennsyl-
vania, laws of the United States are opposed and the execution thereof
obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed" by local offi-
cials.8° Washington then led the federalized militia into Pennsylvania and
174. Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive Discretion to Use the
Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1027, 1057-58 (2008).
175. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.15.
176. Gardina, supra note 174, at 1057.
177. Id. at 1058.
178. Mazzone, supra note 72, at 309 ("Before the militia could be used for this purpose, the
Act required that a district judge or a Supreme Court Justice certify that this condition existed.").
179. Candidus Dougherty, "Necessity Hath No Law": Executive Power and the Posse Comi-
tatus Act, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 10 (2008).
180. G. Washington, A Proclamation (Whiskey Rebellion Proclamation), CLAYPOOLE'S DAILY
ADVERTISER, Aug. 11, 1974, available at http://www.earlyamerica.comearlyamerica/milestones/
whiskey/text.html.
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successfully put down the rebellion.181 In part because President Washington
had deployed the militia without abusing his discretion,8 2 and in part be-
cause Congress wanted to enhance the president's authority to deploy the
militia domestically, Congress removed the requirement for judicial authori-
zation in 1795."'3 The certification requirement was viewed as an
impediment to the president's ability to deploy troops domestically; its re-
moval gave the president near-unitary authority over domestic troopdeployment. 84
The creation of the PCA Court by today's Congress would be consistent
with the goals of the 1795 Congress that deleted the judicial certification
requirement-namely, removing impediments to the president's ability to
deploy troops domestically to suppress insurrections. Today, the president
would seek judicial certification only if he decided such certification would
facilitate his ability to deploy troops. Since it would be entirely within the
president's discretion whether or not to initiate proceedings at the PCA
Court, and since a rejection of the warrant would still leave the president the
option of invoking the Insurrection Act unilaterally, the proposal offered
here presents no new impediments to the president's authority. Quite the
contrary-the proposal here would assist the president in overcoming the
"federalism check" that might otherwise prevent him from invoking the In-
surrection Act.
D. The Warrant as Political Cover
The question remains: why would the president initiate proceedings at
the PCA Court, when he retains the plenary legal authority to invoke the
Insurrection Act unilaterally? The answer, as noted above, is that the warrant
would provide the president an added layer of political cover against criti-
cisms of infringing on states' autonomy. Scholars have noted that, in various
fields of decision making, the president will often "forego the opportunity to
act unilaterally because doing so reduces their political risk."'' 8' As Profes-
sors Stephenson and Nzelibe note, there are occasions when the president
"can reduce his political risk by seeking and obtaining the approval of an-
other government branch, but will dramatically increase his political risk if
he acts unilaterally."'86 Thus, in order to diffuse the possible negative conse-
181. Dougherty, supra note 179, at 10.
182. Id.
183. Gardina, supra note 174, at 1059 n.214.
184. See Dougherty, supra note 179, at 10 (discussing President Jefferson's use of the
"broader calling forth power").
185. Jide 0. Nzelibe & Matthew C. Stephenson, Complementary Constraints: Separation of
Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design, 123 HARv. L. REv. 617, 622 (2010) (discussing
political incentives for the president to avoid acting unilaterally).
186. Id. at640.
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quences of a decision, presidents often have "strong electoral incentives to
share power."
'
11
7
This power-sharing incentive often motivates presidents to seek congres-
sional approval before deciding to use military force abroad. While the
Constitution entrusts Congress with the authority to declare war, presidents
have initiated large-scale military operations abroad without express con-
gressional authorization since the Korean War. Since then, the executive
branch has asserted wide authority to use military force abroad without spe-
cific congressional authorization. 189 And yet, despite this asserted authority,
presidents frequently seek congressional authorization for the use of force
abroad anyway. President George H.W. Bush, for example, sought congres-
sional authorization before using military force against Iraq in 1991, despite
his contention that such authorization wasn't needed. Likewise, President
George W. Bush sought and received congressional approval for the use of
force against Iraq, despite claiming, like his father, that such authorization
was unnecessary.'9 Professors Stephenson and Nzelibe offer the following
account for this behavior:
[A]lthough Presidents sometimes act unilaterally [in use-of-force deci-
sions], they frequently seek congressional approval, and when they do, the
adverse political fallout from interventions that go bad is lessened. Of
course, seeking congressional authorization does not ensure that a presi-
dent and his party will not suffer any backlash from a failed military
engagement .... Nonetheless, presidents typically suffer much more ad-
verse political consequences from unpopular military engagements when
the President initiated the engagement without congressional support.' 9'
The same basic logic applies to the president's decision to deploy troops
domestically to perform law enforcement functions. If the president deploys
troops unilaterally under the Insurrection Act, the adverse consequences of
that decision flow solely to the president. On the other hand, if the president
has sought and received judicial approval before deploying troops domesti-
cally, some of the adverse consequences are deflected by the fact that a
federal court approved of the president's decision ex ante.' 92 After Katrina,
187. Id. at 638; see also David J. Samuels & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialism, Elec-
tions and Representation, 15 J. THEORETICAL POL. 33, 51 (2003).
188. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J.
2280, 2291 (2006).
189. Id.
190. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Imperial and Imperiled: The Curious State of the
Executive, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1021, 1039-40 (2008); Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moor-
ings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND. L.J. 1199, 1219-20 (2006).
191. Nzelibe & Stephenson, supra note 185.
192. Congress could, of course, require that the president seek express congressional authori-
zation before invoking the Insurrection Act. Congress could also retain for itself the power to decide
when the Act should be invoked. But Congress delegated that authority to the president The presi-
dent can respond to insurrections more quickly than Congress. For this same reason-the ability to
act quickly-a federal court is better suited than Congress to "approve" a president's decision to
invoke the Act.
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the Bush Administration was concerned with "how it would have been per-
ceived" if the president had invoked the Insurrection Act and "preemptively
taken from the female governor of another party the command and control
of her forces."' 93 This concern with "perception" might have been mitigated
had the Bush Administration's decision been blessed by a federal court;
such a blessing might have convinced the administration to send troops into
New Orleans. Either way, providing the president with the option to seek
such a blessing would have accelerated and improved the process by which
the administration decided whether or not to deploy troops.
CONCLUSION
Hurricane Katrina is the exception that proves the rule-typically states
are well equipped to handle disaster-relief operations, and almost never are
state and local law enforcement officials incapable of maintaining order in a
natural disaster's aftermath. But as Katrina demonstrated, neither the federal
government nor the state government was prepared to handle a disaster of
such magnitude, and the looting and lawlessness in New Orleans following
the storm created an environment where effective disaster relief became an
impossibility. A military law enforcement presence might have restored or-
der to New Orleans more quickly than actually occurred, but federalism
concerns slowed and ultimately foreclosed this option. Whether or not the
decision not to deploy troops to New Orleans for law enforcement purposes
was correct is less important today; what is important is putting in place a
process that will better and more quickly answer that question the next time
a natural disaster of Katrina's scope befalls the United States. The PCA
Court proposed here would help create a more effective disaster response
process by giving the president greater flexibility when deciding whether or
not to deploy troops domestically for law enforcement purposes.
193. Supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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